Nepravda research
The research covers various aspects of the difficult-to-describe phenomenon of propaganda. It is based on well established books, scientific researches and newspaper articles.
Some of the books consulted during the research
Why not underestimate propaganda
Russian president Vladimir Putin makes a video address launching the "Special military operation"
Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s ratings scored higher, showed a
survey from Levada Center. The same pattern was noted right after the conflict in Georgia in 2008 and with the beginning of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. It seems that decisive decisions positively affect the Russian vote of trust. It is noted also that the negative reaction outside Russia strengthens the Russian faith.
Propaganda invests in mass media
Vladimir Putin visited the new Russia Today broadcasting centre and met with the channel's leadership and correspondents
In the last years, the increasing interest of Internet and Social media news was followed by some government investments in mass media. Firstly the international media outlet Russia Today (now known as RT) was launched in 2005 as part of the state-owned news agency Novosti. The channel is fully funded by the state budget of Russia. RT was created to reduce the influence of English-speaking mass media. It became a tool to reach the international public and to spread material containing the Russian point of view. It was the first Russian channel that broadcasted in German, English, Spanish, French, and Arabic. Today it
broadcasts in more than 20 languages. It broadcasts on satellite and cable television but it has also a website and a YouTube channel. It declares that it has more than a billion page views even though there are some doubts about this claim, but if true, it makes RT the internet news source with the most visitors in the world. RT channel is being accused of being the spokesman of Kremlin propaganda. RT provides an alternative perspective that often discredits the Western point of view. It provides a little number of proven facts, it is not objective and it often diffuses conspiracy theories.
The Russian Federation finances fully from the state budget all the state monopoly structures that produce news. In a state draft budget for the period from 2020 to 2022, there is 91.9 billion RUB (1.08 billion EUR) intended for mass media in 2020 and 71 billion RUB (0.84 billion EUR) more for 2021 and 2022. Mass media seems to be of increasing importance to the Russian government. The budget for mass media is increasing every year.
Television was and still is the primary source of information. In the Russian Federation, there is the so-called multiplex TV channel group that broadcast free of charge in every region of Russia. Multiplex TV channel groups include only either state-owned TV programs or TV programs that are owned by those loyal to the state person.
Sources of news change
In 2014 90% of the population was using TV as a primary source of information. In a survey conducted by Levada Center (2022), is seen that as a primary source of information. In a survey conducted by Levada Center (2022), is seen that with the years this percentage decreased to 73% in 2020. Interest in Internet media and Social media, on the other hand, is increasing. In 2014 only 24% have chosen the Internet and 15% Social media as a main source of information, whereas in 2020 this percentage jumped up to 39 for both categories.
Trolls and bots become tool for persuasion
In addition to the huge news channel network in which propaganda is spread, Russia started a complex campaign through social media in which news tweets and suspicious comments were deliberately distributed by internet trolls and bot social media accounts to influence public opinion.
Klochkova (2022) claims that trolls are often seen in the comment section of news channels, internet accounts of politicians and famous people, forums, blogs, and pages of political parties.
Letter became symbol of war
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, another pro-Russian symbol appeared. The letter Z has become the increasingly ubiquitous emblem of support for the invasion, for the military, for Russian politics, and most of all for the Russian President, Vladimir Putin.Some people see the Z symbol of semi-swastika. It is also named by many the “Swastika.”Around the end of February, the letter Z was noticed painted on many of the Russian military vehicles that have poured into Ukraine.
Since March 2022 the letter Z has cropped up everywhere. The state television channel RT has been officially naming the war “Special Operation Z”. T-shirts with the Z logo came on the market. The Russian online shop “Wildberries” has been selling a diversity of Z-related products, including window stickers for cars.Government institutions organized numerous “flash mobs” promoting the Z symbol, many of which involved university and school students.
Nepravda brings awarness about propaganda
Nepravda started because of the growing problem with propaganda. Propaganda takes substantial part of our daily lifes. It often starts from higher levels in society such us state leaders and politics but than it is spread by mass media and the public. One share button nowadays has more power than weapons. Information warfare is greater than ever and what the research of Nepravda shows is that mass media has great impact on information operations.
Sources used during the research
(full research available in written format)
books:
Berneys, Edward. 2004. Propaganda. New York: Ig Publishing
Harari, Yuval Noah. 2018. 21 Lessons for the 21st Century. Spiegel & Grau
Heller, Steven. 2008. Iron fists : branding the 20th-century totalitarian state. London : Phaidon Press
Seidman, Steven. 2008. Posters, Propaganda, and Persuasion in Election Campaigns Around the World and Through History.
Peter Lang Inc.Shabo, Megadah. 2008. Techniques of Propaganda and Persuasion. Prestwick House Inc
journals, publications and reports:
Compton, Josh, Ben Jackson, and James A. Dimmock. “Persuading Others to Avoid Persuasion: Inoculation Theory and Resistant Health Attitudes.” Frontiers in Psychology 7 (2016). https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00122.
Compton, Josh, Sander Linden, John Cook, and Melisa Basol. “Inoculation Theory in the Post-Truth Era: Extant Findings and New Frontiers for Contested Science, Misinformation, and Conspiracy Theories.” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 15, no. 6 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12602.
Fallis, Don. A Conceptual Analysis of Disinformation. 2009. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/42101173_A_Conceptual_Analysis_of_DisinformationFox
Christopher, Levitin Anany,Redman Thomas. The notion of data and its quality dimensions Information Processing & Management Volume 30, Issue 1, January–February 1994, Pages 9-19 https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/0306457394900205?via%3DihubMatlary, Janne Haaland, and Tormod Heier, eds. “Ukraine and beyond: Russia’s Strategic Security Challenge to Europe,” 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32530-9.
Newman, Nic, Richard Fletcher, Anne Schulz, Simge Andi, Craig T. Robertson, and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen. “Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021.” Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism 10th Edition (2021).
Kuzichkin, A., & Hanley, M. (2021). Russian media landscape: structures, machanisms, and technologies of information oerations. (A. Reynolds, Ed.). NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence.
Hanley, Monika. Russian Media Landscape: Structures, Machanisms, and Technologies of Information Oerations. Edited by Anna Reynolds. NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, 2021.
Helmus, Todd C., Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Joshua Mendelsohn, William Marcellino, Andriy Bega, and Zev Winkelman, Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2237.html. Also available in print form.
Raatikainen, Panu. 2021. “Truth and Theories of Truth”. Chapter in Stalmaszczyk, Piotr (arg.). The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language, 217–232. Cambridge Handbooks in Language and Linguistics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108698283.012.
Paul, Christopher and Miriam Matthews, The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016. https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE198.html.
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